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the interest which I took in the statue, had it photographed with the permission of
the authorities of the Museum, and we owe it to his courtesy that we are able to
offer it to the readers of The Ofen Court. We hereby publicly express our thanks
both to him and to the authorities of the Royal Museum of Leyden.
We have before us in this statue the ideal of Wisdom sitting in the attitude
of a teacher, evidently enforcing the instruction which she gives by the assistance
of her fingers, used in enumerating the points which she makes. The halo behind
her head indicates that the spirit of Buddha is incarnate in her ; her seat, like that
of the Tathagata, is a lotos flower ; her features indicate the influence of the Gan-
dhara school, founded by Greek artists in the Graeco-Indian kingdom of Gandhara
in the valley of the Indus, flourishing in the second and first centuries before Christ.
Javanese art is distinguished by a purity of taste that indicates a purity of
religious sentiment and conception in the artists. What a pity that the civilisation
of which the work of art before us is a symptom was swept from the face of the
earth to be succeeded only by periods of barbarism ! P. C.
BERKELEY'S TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
Berkeley's Treatise Co72Ccrni72g the Principles of Human K^ioivledge, of
which a reprint has just been published as the fourth of the series of Philosophical
Classics of the Religion of Science Library,^ first appeared in Dublin in 1710. The
second edition, the last of the author's life-time, appeared in London in 1734, in
the same volume with the third edition of the Tiirce Dialogues Betzueen Hylas
and Philonous, a reprint of which will also immediately appear in the Religion of
Science Library.
The Principles, published when the author was only twenty-six, is the most
systematic of all of Berkeley's expositions of his theory of knowledge : it was the
direct outgrowth of the Essay Tozoards a Nezu Theory of Vision (1709), which
sought to banish the metaphysical abstractions of Absolute Space and Extension
from philosophy, and was itself mainly concerned with the abolition of Abstract
Matter and of the ontological and theological corollaries of that concept. The Dia-
logues treat of substantially the same subjects, but are more familiar and elegant
in form and are devoted in the main to the refutation of the most plausible popular
and philosophical objections to the new doctrine. They have been called the gem
of British metaphysical literature, and on them Berkeley's claim to be the great
modern master of Socratic dialogue rests. No other writer in English, save per-
haps Hume, has approached Berkeley in lucidity of metaphysical style.
The two books, which mark a distinctively new epoch in philosophy and science,
together afford a comprehensive survey of Berkeley's doctrines, placing within the
reach of every reader in remarkably brief compass opinions which have profoundly
influenced the course of intellectual history. Works of this kind have been almost
invariably distinguished by their brevity. "I had no inclination," is Berkeley's
characteristic remark, "to trouble the world with large volumes. What I have
done was rather with the view of giving hints to thinking men, who have leisure
and curiosity to go to the bottom of things, and pursue them in their own minds.
Two or three times reading these small tracts, and making what is read the occa-
sion of thinking, would, I believe, render the whole familiar and easy to the mind,
1 The Open Court Ppb. Cp. Chicago and London, jgoi. Pp. sv, 128, Price, 25 cents.
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and take off that shocking appearance which hath often been observed to attend
speculative truths."
Berkeley's philosophy, having been the victim of much popular, and even pro-
fessional, misapprehension, the editor has endeavored in his prefatory remarks to
the Pri)iciples, to give by appropriate quotations and digests a synthesis of current
philosophical opinion concerning his doctrines, to point out his relation to his pred-
ecessors, to indicate certain peculiarities of terminology and thought necessary to
the understanding of his theory, and to show finally wherein certain of his analyses
GEORGE BERKELEY
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have been rendered antiquated by modern scientific inquiry. Berkeley's life is so
interesting that we cannot refrain from offering to our readers the sketch given of
it in l^eyNes's Bioi'-7-apJu'cal History of Philosophy [iSi\^), a work which, though
on technical points partisan and not always trustworthy, has at least the merit of a
vivacious style.
LIFE OF BERKELEY.
"There are few men of whom England has better reason to be proud than of
George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne; for to extraordinary merits as a thinker and
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writer he united the most exquisite purity and generosity of character ; and it is
still a moot point whether he was greater in head or heart.
"He was born on the 12th of March, 1685, at Kilcrin, in the county of Kil-
kenny, Ireland. He was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, and was in 1707 ad-
mitted as a fellow. In 1709 he published his Essay Tozuards a N^eiv Theory
of Visio7i, which made an epoch in science } and the year after, his Prhicifles
of Huniati Kiiozuledge, which made an epoch in metaphysics. After this he came
to London, where he was received with open arms. Ancient learning, exact sci-
ence, polished society, modern literature, and the fine arts, contributed to adorn
and enrich the mind of this accomplished man. All his contemporaries agreed
with the Satirist in ascribing
To Berkeley every virtue under heaven.
Adverse factions and hostile wits concurred only in loving, admiring, and contrib-
uting to advance him. The severe sense of Swift endured his visions ; the modest
Addison endeavored to reconcile Clarke to his ambitious speculations. His char-
acter converted the satire of Pope into fervid praise. Even the discerning, fastid-
ious, and turbulent Atterbury said, after an interview with him, "so much learn-
ing, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had
been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman," '^
" His acquaintance with the wits led to his contributing to the Guardian. He
became chaplain and afterwards secretary to the Earl of Peterborough, whom he
accompanied on his embassy to Sicily. He subsequently made the tour of Europe
with Mr. Ashe ; and at Paris met Malebranche, with whom he had an animated
discussion on the ideal theory. In 1724 he was made dean of Derry. This was
worth eleven hundred pounds a year to him ; but he resigned it in order to dedi-
cate his life to the conversion of the North American savages, stipulating only with
the Government for a salary of one hundred pounds a year. On this romantic and
generous expedition he was accompanied by his young wife. He set sail for Rhode
Island, carrying with him a valuable library of books and the bulk of his property.
But, to the shame of the Government, be it said, the promises made him were not
fulfilled, and after seven years of single-handed endeavour he was forced to return
to England, having spent the greater part of his fortune in vain.
" He was made Bishop of Cloyne in 1734. When he wished to resign, the
King would not permit him ; and being keenly alive to the evils of non-residence,
he made an arrangement before leaving Cloyne whereby he settled 200/. a year
during his absence on the poor. In 1752 he removed to Oxford, where, on the
evening of the 14th January, in 1753, he was suddenly seized, while reading, with
palsy of the heart, and died almost instantaneously.
'
'
Of his numerous writings we cannot here speak ; two only belong to our sub-
ject : the Principles of Knozuledge, and the Dialogues of Hylas and Philo7ions.
[His other most important philosophical work was Alciphron, or the Minute Phi-
losopher (1733)]. We hope to remove some of the errors and prejudices with
1 This statement is hardly exact. The Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision was a psycho-
logical rather than a scientific treatise. The work has been vsell characterised by Prof. A. C.
Fraser in his edition of the collected works of Berkeley, Vol. I., page 5, as follows: "The trea-
tise is a professed account of the facts, the whole facts, and nothin;^ but the facts of which we
are visually conscious, as distinguished from pretended facts and metaphysical abstractions,
which confused thought, an irregular exercise of imagination, or an abuse of words had substi-
tuted for them. It is a contribution to the psychological analysis of the fact of vision, and not
a deduction from merely physical experiments in optics or the physiology of the eye."
—
T. J. McC.
2 Sir James Mackintosh.
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which his name is encrusted. We hope to show that, even in what are called his
wildest moods, Berkeley was a plain, sincere, deep-thinking man, not a sophist
playing with paradoxes to display his skill.
THE TRADITIONAL MISCONCEPTION OF BERKELEY'S IDEALISM.
"All the world has heard of Berkeley's Idealism, and innumerable 'coxcombs'
have vanquished it "with a grin.'' Ridicule has not been sparing of it. Argument
has not been wanting. It has been laughed at, written at, talked at, shrieked at.
That it has been understood is not so apparent. Few writers seem to have hon-
estly read and appreciated his works ; and those few are certainly not among his
antagonists.- In reading the criticisms upon his theory it is quite ludicrous to
notice the constant iteration of trivial objections which, trivial as they are, Berkeley
had often anticipated. In fact, the critics misunderstood him, and then reproached
him for his inconsistency—inconsistency, not with his principles, but with theirs.
They force a meaning upon his words which he had expressly rejected ; and then
triumph over him because he did not pursue their principles to the extravagances
which would have resulted from them.
"When Berkeley denied the existence of matter, he simply denied the exist-
ence of that unknown substratu??!, the existence of which Locke had declared to
be a necessary inferetice from our knowledge of qualities, but the nature of which
must ever be altogether hidden from us. Philosophers had assumed the existence
of substance, i. e., of a noiimenon lying underneath zW. phenojneiia—a substratum
supporting all qualities—a something in which all accidents inhere. This unknown
substance Berkeley denies. It is a mere abstraction, he says. If it is unknown,
unknowable, it is a figment, and I will none of it ; for it is a figment worse than
useless ; it is pernicious, as the basis of all Atheism. If by matter you understand
that which is seen, felt, tasted, and touched, then I say matter exists : I am as
firm a believer in its existence as any one can be, and herein I agree zvith the
vulgar. If, on the contrary, you understand by matter that occult substratum
which is not seen, not felt, not tasted, and 7iot touched—that of which the senses
do not, cannot, inform you—then I say I believe not in the existence of matter,
and herein I differ zuith the philoso_phers and agree zvith the vulgar.
" ' I am not changing things into ideas,' he says, ' but rather ideas into things ;
since those immediate objects of perception, which according to you (Berkeley
might have said, according to philosophers) are only appcara7iccs of things, I take
to be the real things themselves.
"
'Hylas: Things! you may pretend what you please; but it is certain you
leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside of zuhich only strikes
the senses.
" 'Philonous: What j'ow call the empty forms and outside of things seem to
m.e the very things themselves.
. . . We both therefore agree in this, that we per-
ceive only sensible forms ; but herein we differ : you will have them to be empty
appearances ; I, real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses; I do.'
" Berkeley is always accused of having propounded a theory which contra-
1 "And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin."
—
Pope.
2 These words were written in 1845-1846. Since then Prof. A. Campbell Eraser's magnificent
edition of Berkeley's collected works (4 vols. Clarendon Press. 1871) and his exhaustive disserta-
tions on Berkeley's doctrines, together with the many excellent histories of philosophy of the last
half century, have rendered such misunderstanding, at least on the part of the philosophical
public, almost impossible.— T. J. HTcC,
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diets the evidence of the senses. That a man who should thus disregard the senses
must be out of his, was a ready answer ; ridicule was not slow in retort : declama-
tion gave itself elbow-room, and exhibited itself in a triumphant attitude. It was
easy to declare (Reid, Inquiry) that ' the man who seriously entertains this belief,
though in other respects he may be a very good man, as a man may be who be-
lieves he is made of glass
;
yet surely he hath a soft place in his understanding,
and hath been hurt by much thinking.'
" Unfortunately for the critics, Berkeley did 7Wt contradict the evidence of
the senses ; did not propound a theory at variance in this point with the ordinary
belief of mankind. His peculiarity is, that he confined himself exclusively to the
evidence of the senses. What the senses informed him of, that, and that only,
would he accept. He held fast to the facts of consciousness ; he placed himself
resolutely in the centre of the instinctive belief of mankind : there he took up his
stand, leaving to philosophers the region of supposition, inference, and of occult
substances.
" The reproach made to him is really the reproach he made to philosophers,
viz., that they would not trust to the evidence of their senses; that over and above
what the senses told them, they imagined an occult something of which the senses
gave no indication. 'Now it was against this metaphysical phantom of the brain,'
says an acute critic (Blackiaood's Magazine, June, 1842, p. 814) 'this crochet-
work of philosophers, and against it alone, that all the attacks of Berkeley were
directed. The doctrine that the realities of things were not made for man, and that
he must rest satisfied with mere appearances was regarded, and rightly, by him as
the parent of scepticism with all her desolating train. He saw that philosophy,
in giving up the reality immediately within her grasp, in favor of a reality sup-
posed to be less delusive, which lay beyond the limits of experience, resembled the
dog in the fable, who, carrying a piece of meat across a river, let the substance slip
from his jaws, while with foolish greed he snatched at the shadow in the stream.
The dog lost his dinner, and philosophy let go her secure hold upon truth. He
therefore sided with the vulgar, who recognise no distinction between the reality
and the appearance of objects, and repudiating the baseless hypothesis of a world
existing unknown and unperceived, he resolutely maintained that what are called
the sensible shows of things are in truth the very things themselves.
"True it is that owing to the ambiguities of language Berkeley's theory does
not seem to run counter to the ordinary belief of mankind, because by Matter men
commonly understand the seen, the tasted, the touched, &c ; therefore when the
existence of Matter is denied, people naturally suppose that the existence of the
seen, the tasted, and the touched is denied, never suspecting that Matter, in its phil-
osophical sense, is ?iot seen, 7iot tasted, 7iot touched. Berkeley has not, it must be
confessed, sufficiently guarded against all ambiguity. Thus he says in one of the
opening sections of his Pri?ici^les of Human Kiiozuledge, that "It is indeed an
opinion strangely prevailing amongst men that houses, mountains, rivers, and,
in a word, all sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their
being perceived by the understanding.' This is striking the key note false. It
rouses the reader to oppose a coming paradox.
" Yet Berkeley foresaw and answered the objections which Wimpey, Beattie,
Reid, and others brought forward. He was not giving utterance to a caprice ; he
was not spinning an ingenious theory, knowing all the while that it was no more
than an ingenuity. He was an earnest thinker, patient in the search after truth.
Anxious, therefore, that his speculations should not be regarded as mere dialectical
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displays, he endeavoured on various occasions to guard himself from misapprehen-
sion.
" ' I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend
either by sensation or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch
with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing
whose existence I deny is that which philosophers call Matter, or corporeal sub-
stance. And in doing this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I
dare say, will never miss it. . . .
" ' If any man thinks we detract from the reality of existence of things, he is
very far from understanding what has been premised in the plainest terms I could
think of. . . . It will be urged that thus much at least is true, viz., that we take
away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word siihstaiicc
be taken in the vulgar sense for a combination of sensible qualities, such as exten-
sion, solidity, weight, &c., this we cannot be accused of taking away.' But if it be
taken in the philosophic sense, for the support of accidents or qualities without the
mind ; then, indeed, I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take
away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.*
" ' But say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still
believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, however plausible, to prevail
over the certainty of them. Be it so ; assert the evidence of sense as high as you
please, zve are zuilUng to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel, doth ex-
ist, i. e., is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being ; but I do
not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof of anything which is
not perceived by sense. '-
"After reading these passages (and more of a similar cast might be quoted) in
what terms shall we speak of the trash written to refute Idealism ? Where was the
acuteness of the Reids and Beatties, when they tauntingly asked why Berkeley did
not run his head against a post, did not walk over precipices, &c., as, in accord-
ance with his theory, no pain, no broken limbs, could result?^ Where was philo-
sophical acumen, when a tribe of writers could imagine they refuted Berkeley by
an appeal to common sense—when they contrasted the instinctive beliefs of man-
kind with the speculative paradoxes of a philosopher, who expressly took his stand
with common sense against philosophers?
"Men trained in metaphysical speculations may find it difficult to conceive the
non-existence of an invisible, unknowable substratum ; but that the bulk of man-
kind find it almost impossible to conceive any such substratum is a fact which the
slightest inquiry will verify. We have experienced this more than once. We re-
member a discussion which lasted an entire evening, in which by no power of illu-
stration, by no force of argument, could the idea of this substance, apart from its
sensible qualities, be rendered conceivable.
"Berkeley, therefore, in denying the existence of matter, sided with common
sense. He thought with the vulgar, that matter was that of which his senses in-
1 An answer to Dr. Johnson' s peremptory refutation of Berkeley, viz., kicking a stone : as if
Berkeley ever denied that what we call stones existed !
'i Principles ofHuman Knmuledge, Sections 35, 36, 37, 40.
3" But what is the consequence? I resolve not to believe my senses. I break my head against
a post that comes in my way ; I step into a dirty kennel ; and after twenty such wise and rational
actions I am taken up and clapt into a madhouse. Now I confess I had rather make one of
those credulous fools whom nature imposes upon, than of those wise and rational philosophers
who resolve to withhold assent at all this expense."—Reid's Inqtdry, ch. vi., sec. 20. This one
passage is as good as a hundred.
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formed him; not an occult something of which he could have no information. The
table he saw before him certainly existed : it was hard, polished, coloured, of a
certain figure, and cost some guineas. But there was no fihantom table lying
underneath the apparent table—there was no invisible substance supporting that
table. What he perceived was a table, and nothing more ; what he perceived it to
be, he would believe it to be, and nothing more. His starting-point was thus what
the plain dictates of his senses, and the senses of all men furnished."
MONCURE D. CONWAY, A MILITANT MISSIONARY OF
LIBERALISM.
Some time ago we published an article on the Boxer Movement, illustrated by
the reproduction of Chinese proclamations and pictures, from the pen of a Chris-
tian missionary, the Rev. George T. Candlin, who lived in China during the out-
break of the troubles, and who is known to our readers through several thoughtful
contributions on Chinese literature to both The Open Court and The Monist. His
pamphlet, Chinese Fiction, published in our Religion of Science Library, shows
his thorough acquaintance with and appreciation of the Chinese character and
modes of thought.
In the present number we offer an article on the same subject, from the oppo-
site standpoint, by Moncure D. Conway, whose trenchant pen has won him a de-
served reputation for the humorous and satirical treatment of such phases of the
religious and social conditions of our age as seem to need reform.
Moncure D. Conway is a descendent of the Washington family, a Virginian
by birth and a minister by education. In 1857, he was compelled to leave Wash-
ington, D. C, where he had charge of a congregation, on account of his denuncia-
tions of slavery. He then accepted a call to a Unitarian church in Cincinnati, and
when the war broke out lectured gratuitously throughout the Northern states, ad-
vocating emancipation. He set a good example to his fellow-citizens by colonising
his father's slaves in Ohio. In 1863, he visited England, and in 1870-71 served as
a war correspondent for the Neiu York Wo7-ld, during the Franco-German War.
Having grown more and more liberal, he became the speaker of the South Place
Ethical Society in London, and since resigning his position lives as a literary man,
devoting himself mainly to religious and ethical topics.
Moncure D. Conway is not yet entirely free from a certain acerbity in the
statement of his propositions, which may be due to the unpleasant experiences and
persecutions to which he has been repeatedly subjected on account of his convic-
tions. Our readers will observe that he denounces militant Christianity on account
of the excrescences of its militant character, but it will be noticed that he himself
has proved his whole life long one of the most fervid militant missionaries for what
he recognised as the truth. p. c.
THE JUDGES OF JESUS, JEWS OR GENTILES?
To the Editor of the Open Court :
Allow me to ask if you will elucidate a statement published in your April num-
ber in your commentary on the story "The Crown of Thorns."
The passage alluded to is as follows: " Jesus was crucified by the Romans,
not by the Jews." Meaning that the death-decree passed on the Teacher of Galilee
by the Sanhedrin of Jerusalem was executed—according to the Roman law—by
Roman officials ?
